Can bank employees put customer data into ChatGPT?
By Verillian. Published . Updated .
Not without a vetted provider under contract. What the Interagency Guidelines and Regulation P require before customer data reaches an AI tool.

Not on a personal or free account, and not into any AI tool the bank has not vetted and put under contract.
The Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards ask a bank to assess the risk that employees or others misuse customer information, to train staff, and to use due diligence and contract terms for any service provider that has access to it. Neither the guidelines nor the privacy rule sections we read name ChatGPT or any AI tool.
The obligation follows what the tool receives and who has agreed to protect it. A bank that allows the use has to be able to show the tool, the contract, and the control.
Banks and credit unions work from parallel rule text. What differs is who supervises the bank, and the 36-hour incident notice that applies to banks.
What do the Interagency Guidelines require when staff use an AI tool?
The guidelines require a bank to assess risk, control it, oversee its service providers and report to its board.
The guidelines implement section 501(b) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and section 39 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. The OCC, the Board, and the FDIC each publish them in their own part of the CFR, the OCC in 12 CFR Part 30, Appendix B, the Board in Part 208, Appendix D-2, and the FDIC in Part 364, Appendix B.
We quote the OCC’s version below. The Supplement to it, on response programs, says its scope and definitions are identical to those of the guidelines. Four parts bear on AI tools.
- Assess risk (III.B). Identify reasonably foreseeable internal and external threats that could result in unauthorized disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of customer information.
- Manage and control risk (III.C). Consider access controls, encryption, monitoring systems and procedures, and response programs, and train staff. Regularly test key controls, with tests conducted or reviewed by parties independent of those who run the program.
- Oversee service providers (III.D). Exercise appropriate due diligence in selecting providers, require them by contract to implement appropriate measures designed to meet the objectives of the guidelines, and, where the risk assessment indicates, monitor them, including by reviewing audits or summaries of test results.
- Report to the board (III.F). At least annually, including service provider arrangements and results of testing.
The guidelines define a service provider as an entity that maintains, processes, or is permitted access to customer information through services it provides directly to the bank. An AI vendor the bank contracts with fits. A tool an employee opens on their own does not, and that is the gap.
Does it change if the employee uses a personal account?
Yes. Section III.D asks for a contract requiring the provider to implement appropriate measures. A personal or free account is an agreement between the employee and the provider on the provider’s standard terms. The bank negotiated nothing and can monitor nothing under it.
If an employee puts customer information into such an account, there is no III.D arrangement to point to. A business agreement differs because the bank can review and negotiate its terms. Whether a given agreement is enough is a due diligence judgment for the bank and its counsel, and the provider’s current terms should be read directly.
The 2026 proposal to replace the third-party relationship guidance says that where a bank lacks a written agreement with a third party, the activity “is unlikely to constitute a third-party relationship.”
That is proposed text, and we cover it in our post on third-party AI vendor risk. Its practical meaning here is that an employee’s personal account may fall outside the vendor framework, so the bank’s own information security controls carry the weight.
What happened when an employee did this at a bank?
In May 2026 CB Financial Services filed an 8-K under Item 1.05, Material Cybersecurity Incidents, after its subsidiary Community Bank learned of an incident “involving the handling of certain non-public customer information using an unauthorized artificial intelligence-based software application.”
The customer information disclosed included names, Social Security numbers and dates of birth, and the company called the event material due to “the volume and sensitive nature” of that information.
American Banker reported that the bank already offered an approved AI tool, and that the employee used a personal account on a personal device. The employee didn’t email the file or copy it to a device, the two things the bank’s data loss prevention policies prohibited.
The bank told American Banker it caught the upload early and reached the vendor in time to keep the information from training a model, that the file and prompts were deleted, and that it has no evidence the data was misused.
The filing says the company expects no material impact on its financial condition, and the name of the tool and the number of customers aren’t public. The bank had an approved tool and a data loss prevention policy, and the data left by a route neither one covered.
Is pasting customer data into an AI tool a disclosure under the privacy rule?
The rule text doesn’t settle it, so this one goes to counsel. Regulation P, 12 CFR Part 1016, limits a financial institution’s disclosure of nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party unless notice and opt out conditions are met (section 1016.10).
Section 1016.13 excepts disclosure to a third party that performs services for the institution, but only if the institution gives the initial notice and has a contract that prohibits the third party from disclosing or using the information other than to carry out the purposes for which it was disclosed. Other exceptions are in sections 1016.14 and 1016.15.
With no contract, the section 1016.13 condition is not met on its face. Whether a particular paste is a “disclosure” that needs a different exception depends on the facts, and nothing in the rule text answers it.
What happens if customer information goes somewhere it should not?
The guidelines call for a response program that specifies actions to be taken when the bank suspects or detects unauthorized access to customer information systems (III.C.1.g).
The Supplement to the guidelines describes the customer notice standard. When a financial institution becomes aware of an incident of unauthorized access to sensitive customer information, it should conduct a reasonable investigation to determine the likelihood of misuse, and if misuse has occurred or is reasonably possible, it should notify the affected customer as soon as possible.
Sensitive customer information includes a name, address, or phone number in conjunction with a Social Security number, account number, or card number, among other items.
The Supplement also draws the line that records make matter. If the institution can determine “from its logs or other data precisely which customers’ information has been improperly accessed,” it may limit notification to those customers.
If it cannot identify which customers, and misuse is reasonably possible, it should notify all customers in the group. Whether an employee’s paste is “unauthorized access” is a judgment call for the bank, and we found nothing that settles it.
Separately, the Computer-Security Incident Notification Rule requires a banking organization to notify its regulator no later than 36 hours after it determines a “notification incident” has occurred. The OCC’s version is at 12 CFR Part 53.
A notification incident is a computer-security incident that has materially disrupted or degraded, or is reasonably likely to, operations, a business line, or financial stability. The definition turns on material disruption, and nothing in it describes a single paste of a customer record.
What will a state examiner ask?
The Conference of State Bank Supervisors gave state examiners a written starting list on September 16, 2026. Its Core Examiner Guide opens with eight scoping questions, and the eighth is this post’s question. “Does the institution enter, process, or transmit customer, consumer, confidential, or sensitive information through artificial intelligence systems, tools, or third-party platforms?”
A no or an unclear answer to the first question, whether the institution uses AI at all, “may warrant confirmation against the institution’s vendor inventory, software inventory, approved tools, and recent product or platform changes”.
For generative AI, the guide has examiners assess controls over the data entered into each tool and ask whether the tool is public, private, internally deployed or vendor-provided.
Each state agency decides how far to use the framework, and the guide says it “does not create new legal obligations or supervisory requirements”. It’s written for state examiners, so a national bank’s examiner works from something else. The questions still make a good test of any bank’s answer.
What do you need in place?
- A written AI use policy approved through the same route as the information security program (III.A), naming approved tools and what customer information may go into each.
- A list of AI services in use and the agreement behind each. An approved tool with a reviewed contract is a III.D arrangement. A tool with neither is not.
- Staff training that draws the line in plain terms, covering what counts as customer information and which tools it may go into (III.C.2).
- A way to see what is happening, not only what the policy says. III.C.1.f asks the bank to consider monitoring systems and procedures, and III.C.3 asks for regular testing of key controls. That’s also what lets you answer the examiner’s eighth question from a record.
- A response step for when customer information reaches a tool it should not have, with a named decision maker for the customer notice and 36-hour questions.
- Service provider arrangements and testing results in the annual board report (III.F).
What record does Verillian keep?
Each AI request Verillian captures is kept as a signed record on your bank’s own servers, each entry naming the person assigned to the enrolled device, the device and the time.
The identifiers your policy flags are replaced on the device when your policy says to redact. When an investigation turns on which customers’ information went where, you’re reading your own record instead of reconstructing it.
Sources
- Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards, 12 CFR Part 30, Appendix B (OCC), sections I to III, and Supplement A, Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice. Parallel texts are 12 CFR Part 208, Appendix D-2 (Board) and Part 364, Appendix B (FDIC). eCFR, read November 3, 2026.
- 12 CFR 1016.1, 1016.10, and 1016.13 (Regulation P). eCFR, read November 3, 2026.
- 12 CFR 53.2 and 53.3, Computer-Security Incident Notification (OCC). eCFR, read November 3, 2026.
- OCC, Board, FDIC, and NCUA, Proposed Third-Party Risk Management Guidance, 91 FR 58536 (September 15, 2026). Federal Register, read November 3, 2026.
- CB Financial Services, Form 8-K, Item 1.05, signed May 11, 2026. SEC, read November 3, 2026.
- American Banker, “A bank breaks its silence on its shadow-AI breach,” June 8, 2026. American Banker, read November 3, 2026.
- Conference of State Bank Supervisors, AI Supervisory Framework (September 16, 2026) and Core Examiner Guide, read November 3, 2026.
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