Can credit union staff put member data into ChatGPT?

By Verillian. Published . Updated .

Not on a personal account, and only under a contract that meets Appendix A to NCUA Part 748. What the rule requires and what to have in place.

A person hands over paperwork across a desk.

Not on a personal or free account, and not without a plan that meets the safeguarding guidelines every federally insured credit union already follows.

Those guidelines, in Appendix A to 12 CFR Part 748, apply to member information “maintained by or on behalf of” the credit union, and they ask the credit union to do due diligence on any service provider that touches it and to require protective measures by contract.

Staff typing a member’s details into a tool the credit union never vetted and has no contract with fails that test on its face. The obligation comes from what the tool receives and who has agreed to protect it, not from the tool’s name.

What matters is whether the credit union has done the vendor oversight Appendix A asks for before member information reaches any AI service, and whether staff know where that line is.

What does Appendix A actually require when staff use an AI tool?

Appendix A to Part 748 requires an information security program that protects member information. It is the credit union version of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act safeguards standards.

It says a credit union’s information security program should be designed to ensure the security and confidentiality of member information and to protect against unauthorized access to or use of it that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to a member. Four parts of the guidelines bear directly on AI tools.

  • Assess risk (III.B). Identify reasonably foreseeable internal threats that could lead to unauthorized disclosure or misuse of member information. An employee pasting a loan file into an outside tool is a foreseeable internal threat once the tool exists.
  • Manage and control risk (III.C). Consider access controls, encryption, and monitoring systems, and train staff to carry out the program. Regularly test the key controls.
  • Oversee service providers (III.D). Exercise appropriate due diligence in selecting providers, require them by contract to implement appropriate measures, and where the risk assessment indicates, monitor them, including by reviewing audits or summaries of test results.
  • Report to the board (III.F). At least annually, the board or a committee should hear about the program, including service provider arrangements and results of testing.

Appendix A defines a service provider as an entity that maintains, processes, or is permitted access to member information through services it provides directly to the credit union. An AI vendor the credit union signs with fits that definition. A tool an employee opens on their own does not, and that gap is the whole problem.

Does it change if staff use a free or personal ChatGPT account?

Yes, and it makes the answer more difficult. Appendix A III.D asks for a contract that requires the provider to implement appropriate measures. A free or personal account is an agreement between the employee and the provider on the provider’s standard terms.

The credit union negotiated nothing, reviewed nothing, and cannot monitor anything under it. If a staff member puts member information into such an account, there is no III.D arrangement.

A business or enterprise agreement is different because the credit union can review and negotiate its terms and require the protections III.D describes. Whether a given agreement is enough is a due diligence judgment for the credit union and its counsel. Read the provider’s current terms rather than a summary, because they change.

Is pasting member data into an AI tool a disclosure under the privacy rule?

The rule text doesn’t settle it, so this one goes to counsel. Regulation P, the privacy rule at 12 CFR Part 1016 that credit unions follow, limits a credit union’s disclosure of nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party unless notice and opt out conditions are met (section 1016.10).

Section 1016.13 makes an exception when the third party performs services for the credit union, but only if the credit union gives the initial notice and has a contract that prohibits the third party from disclosing or using the information other than to carry out the purposes for which it was disclosed. Other exceptions exist in sections 1016.14 and 1016.15.

So this rule also depends on the contract. With no contract, the section 1016.13 condition is not met on its face. Whether a particular paste is a “disclosure” that needs a different exception is a legal question about the specific facts, and nothing we found in the rule or in NCUA’s AI page answers it.

Would a paste have to be reported to NCUA?

Only if it amounts to a reportable cyber incident, and the rule defines that narrowly. Under 12 CFR 748.1(c), a credit union must notify NCUA as soon as possible and no later than 72 hours after it reasonably believes it has experienced a reportable cyber incident.

The definition covers a substantial loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability from unauthorized access to or exposure of sensitive data, a disruption of operations, and a disruption or unauthorized access to sensitive data caused by a compromise of a credit union service organization, cloud service provider, or other third party hosting provider.

Nothing in that text says an employee’s paste is one. What the credit union should have is the response program Appendix A III.C.1.g describes, which specifies what to do when it suspects unauthorized access to member information, and a person who decides whether a given event crosses the line.

That decision is far easier with a record of what happened than without one.

What has NCUA said about AI?

NCUA’s AI resource page, last modified April 28, 2026, lists Letter 07-CU-13, Evaluating Third Party Relationships, and Letter 01-CU-20, Due Diligence Over Third Party Service Providers, as the NCUA resources to reference when evaluating or performing due diligence on third party AI vendors.

It also points credit unions to NIST’s AI resources and to the tools the Treasury developed with the Artificial Intelligence Executive Oversight Group. The page names member data privacy among the challenges of partnering with AI companies.

Letter 07-CU-13 says the planning, due diligence, and controls needed to safely engage a third party depend on the credit union’s risk profile and the type of relationship. Letter 01-CU-20 says a credit union should establish controls to ensure the relationship is meeting its expectations and the third party is meeting its responsibilities. Our post on what examiners will ask covers the exam itself.

What changed recently?

On September 15, 2026, NCUA, the OCC, the Federal Reserve Board, and the FDIC published proposed Third-Party Risk Management Guidance (91 FR 58536, NCUA docket NCUA-2026-1684). For the purposes of the proposal, banking organizations include insured credit unions.

The agencies say they plan to rescind and replace the 2023 interagency guidance, and they ask for comment on whether other guidance documents, interpretive letters, or resources on third-party risk management should also be rescinded.

The proposal does not name Letter 07-CU-13 or Letter 01-CU-20, and its text does not mention artificial intelligence. It describes itself as not setting forth enforceable standards or prescriptive requirements. Comments are due November 16, 2026. Until anything is finalized, the letters above remain what NCUA’s AI page points to, so check that page again before relying on this list.

What do you need in place?

  • A written AI use policy, approved through the same route as the rest of the information security program, that says which AI tools are approved and what member information may go into each. Appendix A III.A gives the board or a committee the job of approving the program.
  • A list of the AI services in use and the agreement behind each one. An approved tool with a reviewed contract is a III.D arrangement. A tool with neither is not.
  • Staff training that names the line in plain terms, covering what counts as member information and which tools it may go into (III.C.2).
  • A way to see what is actually happening, not just what the policy says. Appendix A III.C.1.f asks a credit union to consider monitoring systems and procedures, and III.C.3 asks for regular testing of key controls.
  • A response step for when member information reaches a tool it should not have (III.C.1.g), with a named decision maker for the 72 hour question under 12 CFR 748.1(c).
  • Service provider arrangements and testing results in the annual board report (III.F).

What record does Verillian keep?

Each AI request Verillian captures is kept as a signed record on your credit union’s own servers, each entry naming the person assigned to the enrolled device, the device and the time. The identifiers your policy flags are replaced on the device when your policy says to redact. That gives the person deciding a 72 hour question something to read.

Sources

  • 12 CFR Part 748, Appendix A, Guidelines for Safeguarding Member Information, sections I, II, and III.A to F. eCFR, read November 3, 2026.
  • 12 CFR 748.0, Security program, and 12 CFR 748.1(c), Cyber incident report. eCFR, read November 3, 2026.
  • 12 CFR 1016.10 and 1016.13, Limits on disclosure and the service provider exception. eCFR, read November 3, 2026.
  • 15 U.S.C. 6801, Protection of nonpublic personal information. U.S. Code, read November 3, 2026.
  • OCC, Board, FDIC, and NCUA, Proposed Third-Party Risk Management Guidance, 91 FR 58536 (September 15, 2026). Federal Register, read November 3, 2026.
  • NCUA, Artificial Intelligence (AI) resource page, read November 3, 2026.
  • NCUA Letter to Credit Unions 07-CU-13, Evaluating Third Party Relationships, December 2007, read November 3, 2026.
  • NCUA Letter to Credit Unions 01-CU-20, Due Diligence Over Third Party Service Providers, November 2001, read November 3, 2026.

How redaction and denial work on the device

See Verillian govern AI on a real device.